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Abstract 
Hedonic regressions with house value as the dependent variable are widely used to study 
the value of public services and amenities.  This paper builds on the theory of household bidding 
and sorting to derive a bid function envelope, which provides a form for these regressions.  This 
approach uses a general characterization of household heterogeneity, yields estimates of the price 
elasticities of demand for services and amenities directly from the hedonic with no need for a 
Rosen two-step procedure, and provides tests of key hypotheses about household sorting.  An 
application to data from Cleveland in 2000 yields precise estimates of price elasticities for school 
quality, distance from environmental hazards, and neighborhood ethnic composition.  The results 
support the sorting hypotheses and indicate that household preferences are very heterogeneous, 
with some households placing a negative value on many “amenities.” 
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1 
Introduction 
 House-value regressions, also called hedonic regressions, are one of the central empirical 
tools of urban economics and local public finance.  This tool has been used to study a wide range 
of topics, including the willingness to pay for public services, the willingness to pay for 
environmental quality, the impact of property taxes on housing markets, the trade-off between 
housing and commuting costs, and racial prejudice and discrimination.  Scholars have also 
produced an extensive conceptual literature on each of these topics.  With a few important 
exceptions, however, the conceptual literature has not been used to determine how house-value 
regressions should be specified.  The main purpose of this paper is to bring the conceptual and 
empirical literatures on these topics closer together by introducing the logic of bid functions 
directly into the specification of a house-value regression.  This approach makes it possible to 
test some basic tenets of bid-function theory, facilitates consideration of household 
heterogeneity, and leads to direct estimation of amenity demand elasticities.  
 The foundation of this paper is the theory of household bids for housing in locations with 
different characteristics.  The framework developed here brings together bids for housing based 
on public services, neighborhood amenities, commuting costs, and local taxes.  This framework 
extends the literature in two key directions.  First, I introduce constant-elasticity demand 
functions for public services (or neighborhood amenities) and housing, which have been widely 
used in studies of those topics.  This step leads to bid functions that can be incorporated into 
house value regressions and then estimated.  The functional form I derive can accommodate 
many different public services and amenities, as well as commuting costs and local taxes.  
Moreover, this derivation reveals that the service/amenity and housing price elasticities appear 
directly in bid functions and can be estimated with a one-step hedonic procedure.  
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Second, I introduce household heterogeneity into the public service, amenity, and 
housing demand functions.  Using a very general characterization of this heterogeneity and the 
main theorem from the literature on household sorting (namely, that households sort according to 
the slopes of their bid functions), I derive the envelope of the household bid functions across 
household types and show how this envelope can be incorporated into a house-value regression.  
This derivation shows how some studies confound the amount a given type of household is 
willing to pay for an increment in public services (or in an amenity or in access to jobs) with 
movement along the bid-function envelope, which involves a change in household type.  My 
approach shows how to separate these two effects and leads to a test of the sorting theorem.  This 
approach also can accommodate cases in which an “amenity” has positive value for some 
households and negative value for others, and extension that proves to be important empirically.  
The second part of the paper estimates this new house value regression using data for all 
the house sales in Cleveland in 2000.  I find strong impacts on house values from school district 
characteristics, the crime rate, and distance from environmental hazards and support for the 
sorting theorem.  The regressions also indicate that the share of a neighborhood that is black and 
the share that is Hispanic are disamenities for some households and amenities for others. 
 
Preview of the Literature 
 
 This paper touches on many topics, including household bidding and sorting, hedonic 
equations, the capitalization of property taxes and public services into house values, the impact 
of air pollution on house values, the trade-off between commuting costs and housing prices, and 
racial prejudice and racial residential segregation.  This section provides a brief introduction to 
the literatures on these topics. A more extensive discussion is provided throughout the paper as 
each topic arises in the development of my model and empirical strategy. 
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 This paper begins with the theory of household bidding and sorting.  Many scholars have 
contributed to a standard model that explains how households bid for housing across 
communities with various levels of public services and property taxes and how households sort 
into communities.  Key contributions to this literature have been made by Ellickson (1971), 
Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984, 1993), Epple and Platt (1998), Henderson (1977), and 
Wheaton (1993).  This literature is reviewed in Ross and Yinger (1999).  This theoretical 
literature ties to empirical work because it predicts that property taxes and public service levels 
will be capitalized into the price of housing. 
 A large empirical literature on capitalization, much of it inspired by Oates (1969), has 
also appeared.  Recent contributions on public service capitalization include Black (1999), 
Brasington (2002, 2004, 2007); Brasington and Haurin (2006); Bogart and Cromwell (1997); 
Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2008); Downes and Zabel (2002); Kane, Riegg, and Staiger (2006); and 
Weimer and Wolkoff (2001).  Studies on tax capitalization are reviewed in Yinger et al. (1988) 
and Ross and Yinger (1999). 
A related branch of the literature that is also central to this paper concerns hedonic 
equations, which are designed to estimate the impact of product attributes on product prices.  In 
the case of housing, the product attributes include characteristics of the house’s location, such as 
school quality.  This literature, which is reviewed in Sheppard (1999) and Taylor (2008), goes 
beyond estimating the impact of public services on house values by estimating the underlying 
demand for the public services.  Most studies follow the two-step procedure in Rosen (1974).  
The first step is to estimate a hedonic equation.  The second step is to find implicit prices of 
product attributes by differentiating the hedonic equation and then to estimate the demand for 
each attribute as a function of its price. 
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Brown and Rosen (1982), Epple (1987), and others explain that the main challenge to this 
approach is that the hedonic equation is likely to be nonlinear so that the implicit price depends 
on the quantity of the attribute selected by the household and therefore is endogenous.  Much of 
the literature has been devoted to solving this endogeneity problem.  Epple (1987), Ekeland, 
Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), and Bajari and Kahn (2005) provide alternative estimating 
techniques.  A striking feature of my approach is that because it estimates service/amenity price 
elasticities directly, benefit calculations for changes in public service or amenity levels can be 
estimated without a second step.  
The concept of sorting is brought into the estimation of a hedonic equation by Epple and 
Sieg (1999), Epple, Romer, and Seig (2001), and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007).  The 
first two studies derive and estimate a general equilibrium model in which households sort into 
communities and select the level of local public services.  Bayer, Ferriera, and McMillan address 
the household allocation problem using a discrete choice model in which households are 
allocated across houses according their valuation of housing and neighborhood attributes.  A 
detailed comparison of my approach with these two approaches is provided later in this paper.    
The capitalization and hedonics literatures have also been applied to topics other than 
local public services.  Polinsky and Shavell (1976) extend a basic urban model to include an 
exogenous amenity such as air pollution, and many studies, such as Chay and Greenstone (2005), 
Brasington and Hite (2005), and Bui and Mayer (2003), estimate the impact of pollution on 
property values.  Yinger (1976) extends a basic urban model to include an endogenous amenity, 
with a focus on neighborhood ethnic composition.1  Empirical studies on this topic include Kiel 
and Zabel (1996), Bayer and McMillan (2008), and Zabel (2008). 
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Finally, this paper builds on the central result of the Alonso/Mills/Muth model of urban 
residential structure, namely, that commuting costs are reflected in housing prices.  This model is 
reviewed in Brueckner (1988), and previous tests of the central result can be found in Yinger 
(1979) and Coulson (1991). 
 
The Theory of Bidding and Sorting 
 
 This section provides a comprehensive bidding framework that encompasses public 
services, neighborhood amenities, commuting distance, property taxes, and local income taxes.  
This framework builds on the consensus bidding framework that has been developed in the 
literature, but gives it a new link to empirical application by introducing constant elasticity 
demand functions for public services and amenities.  This section also shows how to incorporate 
this bidding framework into a house-value regression and develops a new method to account for 
household heterogeneity and sorting.  It also shows how to extend this approach to many 
amenities, including air pollution and neighborhood ethnic composition, and to commuting costs, 
and it explains how this approach compares to others in the literature.  
Housing Bids and Locational Equilibrium with Public Services  
This standard model assumes that households maximize utility over public services, 
housing, and a composite good.  Households make bids on housing based on public service 
levels and local property tax rates, and households with different incomes and preferences sort 
into different jurisdictions.  This model assumes that households are mobile, so a key equilibrium 
condition is that all households in an income-taste class achieve the same utility level.  
Households are assumed to live in a metropolitan area with many local governments financed by 
a property tax.  All the people who live in a given jurisdiction are assumed to receive the same 
level of public services, and the only way to gain access to the public services in a jurisdiction is 
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to live there.  A few scholars have examined local income taxes in this setting (Goodspeed 1989; 
Pogodzinski and Sjoquist 1993), and I consider both local property and income taxes.  This paper 
also assumes that all households are homeowners.  Depending on assumptions about property tax 
incidence, the models presented here could be applied to renters, as well. 
  In this model, a household maximizes a utility function over housing services, H; the 
quality of public services, S; and a numeraire good, Z, subject to a budget constraint.  This 
constraint sets household income, Y, equal to Z plus housing consumption, PH, where P is the 
price per unit of H, plus property taxes.  A household’s property tax payment is the effective tax 
rate, τ, multiplied by its house value, V = PH/r, where r is a discount rate.  In symbols, 
 1 (1 *)Y Z PH V Z PH Z PH
r
ττ τ⎛ ⎞= + + = + + = + +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 (1) 
where τ* = τ/r.  
A straightforward way to derive housing bids is to determine the maximum amount a 
household would pay per unit of H in different locations, holding utility constant.2 Solving 
equation (1) for P, this approach leads to the following maximization problem: 
 
0
Maximize  
(1 *)
Subject to { , , }
Y ZP
H
U Z H S U
τ
−
=
+
=
 (2) 
where U0 is the utility level obtained by households in this income-taste class.  In this problem, Z 
and H are the choice variables, and S and τ are parameters.  As a result, the envelope theorem can 
be used to determine the impact of S and τ on bids.  Specifically,  
 /
(1 *) (1 *)
S Z S
S
U U MBP
H Hτ τ
= =
+ +
 (3) 
and 
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( ) (1 *)t
P rPP
r τ τ
= − = −
+ +
 (4) 
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives.  The key to interpreting equation (3) is to recognize 
that its numerator is the marginal rate of substitution between S and the numeraire, which is 
simply the height of the demand curve, also called the marginal benefit from S or MBS. 
 The differential equation (4) can be solved using the initial condition that the before-tax 
price, P̂ , which depends on S, equals the after-tax price, P, when τ equals zero.  The solution is                             
 
ˆ{ }{ , }
(1 *)
P SP S t
τ
=
+
 (5) 
 Differentiating (5) with respect to S yields another helpful result:  
 
ˆ
(1 *)
S
S
PP
τ
=
+
 (6) 
Bringing in an Public Service Demand Function 
Now let us part from the literature by assuming that the demand for public services takes 
a constant-elasticity form.  This form has been widely used and works well in demand functions 
estimated with community-level data (Duncombe and Yinger 1998).  This form is 
 SS K N Y W
θ μδ=  (7) 
where W equals tax price, KS is a constant, and N is a vector of preferences and perhaps other 
variables that influence the demand for S.  Now the inverse demand function for S can easily be 
derived by solving equation (7) for W : 
 
1/
S
S
SW MB
K N Y
μ
θδ
⎛ ⎞
= ≡⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 (8) 
The constant-elasticity form has also been widely used for housing (Zabel 2004): 
 ( )(1 *)HH K M Y P
νρ γ τ= +  (9) 
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where KH is a constant and M is a vector of preference and perhaps other variables that influence 
housing demand.  Using equation (5), this equation can be re-written as 
 ˆHH K M Y P
ρ γ ν=  (10) 
Combining equations (3), (6), (8), and (10) yields 
 
( )
1/
1/
1/ ( / )
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
S
S
H S H
S
K N YMB SP
H K M Y P K N K M Y P
μ
δ θ μ
μρ γ ν δ ρ θ μ γ ν+
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠= = =  (11) 
or 
 
( )
1/
1/
1/ ( / )
ˆ ˆ
S
S H
SP P S
K N K M Y
μ
ν μ
μτ ρ θ μ γ
ψ
+
= =  (12) 
where 
 ( )( ) 11/ ( / )S HK N K M Yμτ ρ θ μ γψ −+=  (13) 
Equation (12) is an exact differential equation, which can be solved by integrating both sides: 
 1 (1 )/1 ˆ
1 1
P C Sν μ μψμ
ν μ
+ +⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ = +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (14) 
where C is a constant of integration.  Solving for P̂ yields 
 ( )
1/(1 )
(1 )/ˆ{ } 1
1
P S C S
ν
μ μψμν
μ
+
+⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (15) 
Sorting 
  The next step is to allow for multiple types of households. According to the standard 
model, different household types sort into different jurisdictions because their bid functions have 
different slopes with respect to S.  As shown by Ellickson (1971), Henderson (1977), Yinger 
(1982, 1995), Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984, 1993), and Wheaton (1993), the household type 
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with the steepest bid function wins the competition for housing in the jurisdiction with the 
highest-quality public services. Several scholars build models with continuous household 
distributions, not discrete income-taste classes.  In these models, household types are determined 
by a distribution of income (Epple, Filimon, and Romer 1984, 1993) or of both income and 
preferences (Epple and Platt, 1998).  This approach leads to the same general result:  Households 
with steeper bid functions live in jurisdictions with higher S.  A key assumption in all these 
models is the so-called single-crossing assumption, which says that if a household type has a 
steeper bid function than another at one value of S, it also has a steeper bid function at other 
values of S.  My approach to sorting builds on the single-crossing assumption and the assumption 
that people sort into different jurisdictions according to the relative slopes of their bid functions.  
 The slope of household’s bid function is the derivative of P̂  with respect to S, which is 
given by equation (11).  A household type’s relative slope is determined by all the variables in 
equation (11) that are unique to that household, that is, everything except for S and P̂ .  These 
terms are exactly the ones collected in ψ as defined by equation (13).   In other words, ψ can be 
interpreted as in index of the steepness of a household’s bid function—and hence and index of 
the value of S into which the household sorts. 
 To translate this observation into an estimating equation, we can derive the envelope of 
bid functions with various values of ψ.  This envelope defines the set of winning bids.  Consider 
two household types whose bid functions cross at a given value of S, say S*. These households 
have different values of ψ and hence different bid-function slopes, but, by the definition of 
“cross,” they also have the same bid, P̂ , at S*.  As shown in Figure 1, therefore, the bid function 
with the steeper slope must have a smaller intercept. The derivation of an envelope therefore 
involves finding a formula for the constant term such that d P̂ /dψ = 0  when S is held constant at 
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S{ψ}, that is, at the value of S associated with the “winning slope”.   Applying this condition to 
equation (15), we find that 
 
1
{ }
{ }
1S S
dC S
d
μ
μ
ψ
μ ψ
ψ μ
+
=
−
=
+
 (16) 
  To solve this differential equation, that is, to find the envelope, we need to specify a form 
for S{ψ}.  This form depends on the distribution of the factors that influence ψ, as well as on the 
distribution of S and the sizes of the jurisdictions with different values of S.  In other words, it 
depends on the demand for and supply of S.  I do not derive this form theoretically, but instead 
approximate it with a general form, the parameters of which can be estimated.  The most general 
form I have been able to find that leads to a differential equation with an analytical solution is 
 31 2{ } ( )S
σψ σ σ ψ= +  (17) 
Substituting equation (17) into equation (16) and integrating leads to: 
 ( )
3 (1 )
1 2
0
3 21 (1 )
C C
σ μ μ
μσ σ ψμ μ
μ σ μ μ σ
+ +⎛ ⎞+⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (18) 
where C0  is a constant of integration. Solving equation (17) for ψ and substituting the result and 
equation (18) into equation (15) leads to the bid envelope, identified with superscript E: 
 ( ) 3
1/( 1)
1 11
1
0
2 2
3
1 1ˆ { } 1 1 11
EP S C S S
ν
μμ
μ σμσ μν μσ μ σ
μ σ
+
⎛ ⎞+⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ +⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (19) 
This envelope is illustrated in Figure 2 (using assumed values for the parameters).  Equation (19) 
makes it clear that the impact of S on bids depends not only on household’s willingness to pay 
for S, as indicated by μ, but also on the sorting process, as measured by the σ parameters.  To put 
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it another way, any estimated impact of S on housing prices describes movement along the bid-
function envelope, not the willingness to pay of a particular type of household.3 
 Further explanation of this approach is provided by Figure 3, which is an extension of 
figures in Follain and Jimenez (1985) and Taylor (2008).  The bid-function envelope, two 
illustrative bid functions for specific household types, and two illustrative offer functions for 
housing providers appear in the top panel.  The slopes of these functions are plotted in the 
bottom panel.  Even though people with steeper bid functions sort into higher-S locations, the 
slope of the envelope declines as the level of S increases because all the underlying individual 
bids are affected by movement down the individual demand curves for S.  This decline in the 
slope of the envelope is moderated by the increase in the slope of the underlying bid functions as 
groups with steeper slopes win the competition at higher levels of S.  An illustrative S{ψ} 
function, which captures the second effect, appears in Figure 3.  This function is anchored by bid 
function i; it indicates how much the slope must increase to go from the slope of bid function i 
(which includes just the first effect) to the slope of the envelope (which includes both effects).  
The positive slope of the S{ψ} function corresponds to the theorem that household types  
with steeper bid functions win the competition for housing at higher levels of S.  It follows that 
we can test this theorem by looking at the sign of the estimated slope of this function, which is 
determined by the sign of σ2 in equation (17).  So long as σ3 is positive, which is assumed in all 
my estimations, a positive sign for σ2 supports the sorting theorem. 
Generalizing to Many Services or Amenities 
A key advantage of this approach is that, under fairly general assumptions, it can be 
applied to the case of many public services and to amenities, such as clean air.  Suppose S is a 
vector of public service outcomes and amenities, indexed by i, each with its own constant-
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elasticity demand function.  Then there is a separate version of the above equations for each Si.   
If the demand for Si does not depend on any Sj, j ≠ i, then the expressions for Sj can be treated as 
part of the constant of integration, C, in equation (19) for Si, and the envelope with an S vector is  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1/( 1)
1
1 0
2 2
1ˆ { ,..., } 1 i iE in i i
i i i i i
P S S C S S
ν
η ζσν
σ η σ ζ
+
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟= + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑  (20) 
where  
 
3
1 11 andi ii i
i i i
μ μη ζ
μ σ μ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ +
= + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (21) 
In standard demand theory, the first-order conditions for utility maximization are solved 
to yield a set of demand equations, and the demand for Xi is not a function of Xj, although it may 
be a function of the price of Xj.  In the analysis considered here, however, a household is not 
selecting Si and Sj, but is instead deciding how much to bid at given values of Si and Sj.  If Si and 
Sj are complements or substitutes, therefore, the amount that a household bids to live in a 
community with a certain value of Si may depend on how much Sj the community provides.  If 
this dependence is direct, the derivation of the household-type-specific bid functions underlying 
equation (20) runs into a problem.  To be specific, the derivative of this bid function with respect 
to Sj now has two terms, equation (11) and a new term representing the impact of a change in Sj 
on the household’s willingness to pay for Si.  Differentiating equation (15) no longer leads to the 
same answer as integrating equation (11).   
To resolve this problem, I assume that Si may depend on the determinants of Sj, but not 
on Sj itself.  If Si and Sj are complements, for example, households may demand more Si in a 
community that has relatively low costs for producing Sj, and is therefore more likely to select a 
high value of Sj.  The systematic determinants of Sj can be treated as components of the N vector 
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in equation (7) for Si, and therefore cause no complications for the derivation.  An equivalent 
assumption is that households demand for Si reflects the systematic determinants of Sj but not the 
unobserved and random factors.  It is as if the household expects the systematic factors to 
determine the level of Sj, at least in the long run, so they ignore the Sj error term when thinking 
about the impact of Sj on their bids associated with Si.  
In addition, an extension to many amenities must assume that the table of values for the 
various amenities is full enough, as a first approximation, so that each amenity can be selected 
independently of all others.  A high correlation between two measures of school quality, for 
example, might force households to select from a limited number of amenity pairs, so that the 
marginal conditions derived here do not hold.  In this case, it would be appropriate to combine 
these two measures into a single index and to treat this index as the amenity measure, which is 
the procedure I follow below in averaging passing rates across various state tests. 
Neighborhood Ethnic Composition 
 Scholars have long recognized that a neighborhood’s ethnic composition might influence 
house values for at least three reasons (Kiel and Zabel 1996).  First, ethnic prejudice may lead 
some households to prefer neighborhoods in which their own ethnic group is concentrated.  
According to the survey evidence, some people in every ethnic group have this type of prejudice 
(see, for example, Charles 2000), so prejudice alone is unlikely to generate a monotonic 
relationship between a neighborhood’s ethnic composition and housing price.4 
Second, historically disadvantaged minority groups tend to cluster in neighborhoods with 
poor amenities, even after controlling for income (Deng, Ross, and Wachter 2003).  This 
clustering presumably reflects past discrimination and the attendant disparities in wealth and 
other factors that influence housing choices.  To the extent that these poor amenities cannot all 
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be observed, ethnic composition might serve as a proxy for them.  Not all unobserved amenities 
in largely minority neighborhoods need be negative, of course.  People in a certain ethnic group 
might bid more to live in neighborhoods where their group is concentrated to gain access to 
ethnic restaurants or social organizations that are located there.  
Third, households belonging to certain ethnic groups might continue to face 
discrimination in housing and mortgage markets.  Although the extent of discrimination has 
declined over time, recent audit studies have found evidence of continuing discrimination against 
blacks and Hispanics in these markets (Ross and Turner 2005; Ross et al. 2008).  Discrimination 
could affect our estimated hedonic regression in three ways.  First, price discrimination against 
certain groups could lead to higher housing prices in neighborhoods where those groups are 
concentrated.  This effect seems unlikely, however; recent studies find no evidence of price 
discrimination in housing markets (Ross and Turner 2005).  Second, discrimination could push 
blacks and Hispanics into neighborhoods with poor amenities, thereby reinforcing the correlation 
between unobserved neighborhood traits and ethnicity discussed above.  One study based on 
1989 housing audit data (Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger 2003) found that even after controlling for 
housing price, real estate brokers steered blacks, but not whites, toward neighborhoods that had 
lower average house values or higher average house ages than the one that was original 
requested.  Third, discrimination might restrict the ability of minority households to move out of 
largely minority neighborhoods and thereby artificially boost housing prices there. 
 An unusual feature of the bid functions derived earlier makes it possible for them to 
accommodate cases in which an increment in an “amenity” has a positive impact on bids for 
some households and a negative impact for others.  According to equation (17), a household’s 
marginal willingness to pay for an amenity, ψ, is negative if 
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As a result, any bid function that is tangent to the envelope at a value of S below σ* has a 
negative slope.  The regressions presented below provide an estimate of σ* for each amenity and 
therefore indicate whether some households have a negative ψ for each amenity.   
Because a majority of the population in my sample is white, I define two “amenities” as 
the inverse of the black or Hispanic concentration in a neighborhood.  People who prefer a white, 
non-Hispanic neighborhood will place a positive value on these “amenities.”  If some households 
(of any ethnicity) value an increase in the black or Hispanic population, then the estimated values 
of σ* will be greater than the minimum value of these two “amenity” variables in the sample. 
Unlike previous work on this topic (including my own), therefore, this approach does not 
confuse the estimated bid envelope with the willingness to pay of any particular group.  Instead, 
the degree of heterogeneity in household preferences is revealed by the estimation. 
 My specification also identifies neighborhoods in or near a black ghetto (defined as a set 
of contiguous neighborhoods with a population that is at least 80 percent black).  These two 
variables control for additional price effects that reflect unmeasured neighborhood quality 
variables in the ghetto, expectations about potential racial transition near the ghetto, or 
discriminatory restrictions on the ability of blacks to move outside the ghetto. 
This specification obviously cannot fully separate all these factors.  A negative 
relationship between housing prices and percentage minority could reflect either prejudicial 
attitudes on the part of whites or the effect of unmeasured neighborhood variables correlated 
with minority composition.  A positive relationship between housing prices and percentage 
minority over some range could reflect prejudicial attitudes on the part of minorities or a 
preference among some households for amenities that cluster in high-minority neighborhoods. 
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Similarly, a finding that housing prices are lower either in or near the black ghetto than 
elsewhere could reflect either attitudes or unmeasured amenities.  
Commuting Costs 
In a standard urban model, P̂  depends on distance from the CBD (or other worksite), 
labeled u, and per-mile commuting costs, t.  Without operating costs, which are discussed more 
fully below, an equivalent approach is to introduce commuting time, T, valued at ωY per hour. 
Adding ωYT  to the household budget constraint leads to the equilibrium condition, PT = -ωY/H. 5   
Combining this condition with the housing demand equation (12) and recognizing that income 
now must be expressed net of commuting costs yields,6  
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Multiplying through by P̂ν results in another differential equation, the solution to which is 
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where Cʹ is a constant of integration.7  Because this equation does not involve amenities or 
public services, it can be brought into equation (20) through the constant of integration. 
 The literature contains two approaches to household heterogeneity in a distance-based bid 
function.  Beckman (1969) and Montesano (1972) derive bid functions assuming that the 
distribution of income across households takes the form of a Pareto distribution.  Hartwick, 
Schweizer, Varaiya (1976) derive and Yinger (1979) estimates a model with distance-based bid 
functions for different discrete income classes.  The technique developed earlier for public 
services provides an alternative approach, namely the derivation of the envelope of the distance-
based bid functions across household types.  This technique provides a more general foundation 
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for empirical work than previous ones because it allows for a continuum of household types 
defined by both Y and other (not necessarily observed) traits.8 
 To derive the envelope, we can re-write equation (26) as 
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Household sorting by distance from a worksite depends on the slope of the bid function with 
respect to time, as given by equation (23), or the equivalent result for distance (Glaeser, Kahn, 
and Rappaport 2008).  The terms in equation (26) include all the terms that determine the slope 
of a household type’s bid function relative to that of other household types.  As a result, 
integrating ψT out of equation (25) yields the envelope of bid functions across household types. 
An estimating equation can be derived with a linear approximation for the ψT function.  
 1 2T T TT σ σ ψ= +  (27) 
This form leads to  
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This bid-function envelope is illustrated in Figure 4.  As with amenity-based bid functions, this 
result shows that attempts to estimate bid-function parameters without considering household 
types (that is, without considering the σ parameters) and sorting may lead to misinterpretation.  
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The assumption of no operating costs requires further comment.  This assumption is 
particularly plausible for transit trips, at least in Cleveland, because the fare does not depend on 
distance.  Moreover, even with automobile travel, operating costs of travel are far below time 
costs.  Using assumptions discussed below, operating costs are about 12.5 percent of total costs 
per mile.    If commuting speed does not depend on income, the assumption of no operating costs 
implies that the income elasticity of per-mile transportation costs, say χ, equals 1.0.  As is well 
known, so-called normal sorting, with higher-income households living at greater distances from 
worksites, arises if γ is greater than χ.  Most find that γ  < 1 (Zabel 2004), which implies that that 
normal sorting will not occur.  As pointed out by Wheaton (1977) and Glaeser, Kahn, and 
Rappaport (2008), however, the estimated elasticities may not lead to normal sorting even with 
operating costs.  In fact, if operating costs equal 12.5 percent of total cost, χ equals (1-.125) = 
0.875, which is still above most estimates of  γ. 
 The assumption that operating costs equal zero does not imply that normal sorting cannot 
occur, however.  Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport show that normal sorting can arise if mode-
choice decisions are linked to income.  Although the derivations presented here cannot account 
for mode choice, they can account for the relationship between commuting speed and income.  A 
positive impact of income on commuting speed lowers χ and makes normal sorting more likely.  
Normal sorting can also arise from a correlation between Y and the M variables in the demand 
function for H.  The standard derivation assumes that nothing else in the housing demand 
function is correlated with Y.  If ρ, the correlation between M and Y, is positive however, then 
sorting could lead to a positive correlation between Y and u, which is the definition of normal 
sorting, even if γ < 1.  To be specific, normal sorting arises if the total derivative of H with 
respect to Y is greater than χ, that is, if 
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Local Income Taxes 
 In Ohio, local school districts are allowed to levy income taxes.  The income tax rates 
districts select lead to another dimension of bidding and sorting.  With a local income tax 
imposed at rate y, a household’s net income is Y(1-y).9  This leads to a bid function over values 
of y that takes exactly the same form as the bid functions over values of T, except that (1-y) 
replaces (1-ωT).  The bid function envelopes also take the same forms with this substitution 
(and, obviously, with σy1 replacing σT1 and σy2 replacing σT2). 
The Final Estimating Equation 
Finally, following equation (1) we can combine bids with τ and H, which is a function of 
structural housing characteristics, X.  Following the literature (see Ross and Yinger 1999), I also 
introduce a parameter, β, to indicate the degree of property tax capitalization.  The result: 
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where ˆ EP  now contains the elements of equations (20) and (28), as well as the terms from the 
comparable equation for y.  When this equation is estimated, the error term reflects unobserved 
housing characteristics and individual bids that differ from market bids because of the bargaining 
skill (or lack thereof) of the people involved. In addition, I specify H{X} as multiplicative; Sieg 
et al. (2002) show that this form is consistent with the assumption used in this paper that V is the 
product of P (a function of locational characteristics) and H (a function of the Xs). 
Recovering the Other Demand Parameters 
 Successful estimation of equation (20) and (28) (through equation (30)) yields the price 
elasticity of demand for each amenity and the income and price elasticities of demand for 
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housing.  Moreover, the estimation of the σ parameters makes it possible to solve equation (17) 
for ψ and hence to estimate equation (13) for each amenity.  Because S does not appear on the 
right side of equation (13), this estimation avoids the endogeneity problem that arises with the 
Rosen two-step method.10  One disadvantage of this approach is that, except for the case of Y, it 
cannot separate the impacts on S and H of a variable that appears in both demand functions. 
The coefficient of the estimated income term for equation (26) provides a test of the 
standard condition for normal sorting around a worksite.  In the case of an amenity, normal 
sorting is defined as a sorting equilibrium in which higher-income households live in locations 
with better amenities.  As first shown by Henderson (1977), normal sorting based on an amenity 
requires that θ/μ + γ < 0, so the coefficient of the income term in equation (13) provides a test of 
this condition.11  The standard formula for omitted variable bias implies that this test can be 
extended to consider the indirect effects of income, as in equation (29), by estimating this 
equation with income as the only explanatory variable.   
Comparison with Previous Approaches 
 The first step in the Rosen (1974) approach is to estimate an approximation to the 
hedonic equation.  This approach brings no theoretical guidance to the specification of this 
equation, so many scholars have used flexible estimating techniques.  Several early studies, 
including Halvorsen and Pollakowski (1981), estimated this equation using the Box-Cox 
specification.  Some more recent studies, including Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), 
estimate the price function using parametric or semi-parametric techniques.  This paper differs 
from most previous research in that it derives a theoretical form for the hedonic equation, which, 
curiously enough, is similar to the Box-Cox form.12   
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 In addition to functional form, studies of the first-step hedonic have addressed problems 
of endogeneity and omitted variables.13  Brasington and Hite (2008) argue that housing prices 
link housing characteristics with household characteristics and thereby create an endogeneity 
problem.  This problem appears in equation (15), which contains household characteristics, but 
disappears from equation (19) because the household characteristics have been integrated out. 
Many scholars argue that omitted variables lead to biased estimates for service/amenity 
variables, and a variety of different solutions to this problem have been proposed.  One well-
known approach based on school-attendance zone boundaries was introduced by Black (1999) 
and appears in Kane, Riegg, and Staiger (2006) and Bayer, Ferriera, and McMillan (2007).  
Scholars using this approach create a series of fixed effects for houses within a certain distance 
of school attendance zone boundaries.  These scholars argue that houses near the same boundary 
share many unobserved neighborhood traits; the fixed effects are intended to control for these 
traits and to eliminate any bias that would arise if they were left out of the regression.14 A second 
approach is to take advantage of unusual boundary arrangements, such as those created when a 
municipality contains more than one school district, to control for non-school factors.  Examples 
include Bogart and Cromwell (1997) and Weimer and Wolkoff (2001).   
A third strategy is to estimate the hedonic with an instrumental variables technique to 
eliminate the omitted variable bias.  Good instruments for this approach are difficult to find.  
Policy choices by higher levels of government lead to compelling instruments in some studies, 
such as the Chay and Greenstone (2005) study of air pollution or the Gibbons and Machin (2003) 
study of public schools.  In most other cases, such as Weimer and Wolkoff (2001) or Downes 
and Zabel (2002), the instruments are selected from a list of neighborhood characteristics, and it 
is difficult to see why they should be considered exogenous. 
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The second step in the Rosen approach is to calculate implicit prices, which are the 
derivatives of the estimated hedonic with respect to each service or amenity [ ˆ / ( )ESP H r tβ+ ], 
and then to estimate a demand model for that service or amenity.  Because households set the 
marginal benefit from an amenity equal to its implicit price, this implicit price can be used as the 
dependent variable in an estimation of an inverse demand function for S, such as equation (8), or 
as an explanatory variable in a direct demand function, such as equation (7). 
 As noted earlier, the principal challenge facing this step is endogeneity; with a nonlinear 
price function a household’s unobserved traits may affect both quantity and price, that is, both S 
and W (the implicit price) in equations (7) and (8). Many scholars have developed ways to 
address this endogeneity problem.  See, for example, Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004).  
Bajari and Kahn (2005) assume a unitary price elasticity of demand for the S.  In this case, 
multiplying equation (8) by S leads to a new regression with the implicit price multiplied by S as 
the dependent variable and only the exogenous variables in the denominator as explanatory 
variables.  This approach cannot be generalized, however, to non-unitary price elasticities.
 As explained earlier, the approach proposed here avoids this endogeneity problem in a 
different way.  First, this approach makes it possible in principle to estimate μ directly, with no 
need for a two-step procedure.  Second, the other demand parameters for S and H, can be 
estimated via equation (13), which does not have S on the right side for any value of μ. 
 Several recent studies have explicitly considered sorting in hedonic regressions.15  One 
approach with similarities to the one used here can be found in Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple, 
Romer, and Sieg (2001).  These scholars estimate general equilibrium models in which (as in 
Epple and Platt 1998) people sort according to income and to a parameter in their utility 
function.16  Their analysis includes the analog to a bid-function envelope for a single amenity 
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and also avoids the standard endogeneity problem.  This approach is based on an explicit form 
for the indirect utility function that is consistent with a constant elasticity demand function for H 
but not for S.  These models are estimated using a complicated statistical procedure that solves 
for the parameter values that produce the best correspondence between the distributions of 
outcomes generated by the model and the distributions of outcomes in a sample of communities.   
The great strengths of these studies are that they incorporate both household sorting and 
the determination of S through voting once sorting has taken place and that they explicitly solve 
for an equilibrium and incorporate the solution into the estimating method.  My approach cannot 
do either of these things.  Instead, my approach overcomes some of the empirical weaknesses of 
these studies, namely, that they are limited to aggregate (community level) data, that they are 
difficult to extend beyond a single amenity, that they consider only two dimensions of household 
heterogeneity, and that they require a complex statistical technique.   
  Another clever approach is provided by Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007).17  They 
use a complex procedure to estimate a multinomial discrete choice model in which households 
have different preferences and each household is allocated to the house that gives it the highest 
utility (net of price).  An equilibrium allocation is therefore built into their estimation procedure.  
By focusing on household choice, instead of household bidding, this approach also can directly 
estimate variation in the amount different types of households are willing to pay for each 
amenity.18  The main disadvantages of this approach are that it is based on a highly restrictive 
linear utility function and that it requires complex estimating procedures. 
 Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) also estimate a standard hedonic equation to obtain 
average preferences (average MWTP) for each amenity.  A simplified version of their utility 
function for household i in house h is 0ih i ji hj hi h
j
V X Pα α α= + −∑  , where V stands for utility, the 
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X’s denote housing characteristics, and P is the price of housing.19  A bid function for a given 
household (or household type) is found by solving for the price, say P*, that holds utility constant 
(at V*) over housing and neighborhood traits.  As a result, the bid function in this case is 
( ) ( )* *0 / /hi i i hi ji hi hj
j
P V Xα α α α= − +∑ .  Households sort according to the steepness of this bid 
function, so households with higher values of  ( )/ji hiα α  live in locations with higher values of 
Xj.   This sorting problem leads to a bid-function envelope, which is the market price of housing. 
Consider a single amenity, simplify the bid function to *i i iP a b X= + , and assume that the 
sorting equilibrium can be described by 1 2i iX bσ σ= + .  Then, following the procedure presented 
earlier, the bid-function envelope is 21 2 2( / ) / (2 )
EP C X Xσ σ σ= − + , where C is a constant.  
This derivation can be extended to many X’s, each of which will enter in quadratic form.  Even 
with a linear utility function, in other words, the bid-function envelope (i.e. the hedonic equation) 
is a quadratic function of the X’s.20  By Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan’s own assumptions, 
therefore, the linear hedonic equation they estimate is mis-specified, and their argument that the 
estimated coefficients indicate average preferences is implausible.21 
Epple and Sieg (1999), Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001), Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 
(2007) and Bajari and Kahn (2005) explicitly allow for heterogeneity in household preferences.22  
The approach developed here also accounts for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the 
demand for S and H both in the first step (where it is integrated out) and through the error term in 
the second-step regression, namely, equation (13).  The estimating equation (30) also contains H 
directly, and accounts for observed or unobserved determinants of demand through the impact of 
these factors on housing characteristics, X.  Neither my approach, nor any other, can rule out the 
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possibility of bias from omitted X’s, but this type of bias is unlikely to be significant with a data 
set in which many X’s appear, such as the Cleveland data set used in this paper.  
 
  Estimation Procedures 
 Equation (30) provides a one-step conceptual method for obtaining service/amenity 
demand elasticities.  Although this equation could be estimated directly, we can ensure both that 
the coefficients of the structural housing characteristics are not biased because of their 
correlation with unobserved neighborhood characteristics and simultaneously that the locational 
dimension of housing prices is accurately measured by estimating it in two stages.  The first 
stage is a standard hedonic regression of the log of sales price on housing characteristics (X), 
within neighborhood differences, and neighborhood fixed effects.  The second stage uses the 
coefficients of the fixed effects as the dependent variable to determine how locational 
characteristics affect the bid envelope (and underlying bids) using the forms derived earlier, after 
controlling for an extensive set of geographic variables.23 
Data 
 The data used for this study build on the data set described in Brasington (2007) and 
Brasington and Haurin (2006).  This data set consists of all the house sales in Ohio in 2000; this 
study makes use of the 22,857-observation sub-sample for Cleveland.  As discussed more fully 
below, the data set contains information on sales price, housing characteristics, housing location, 
census block group characteristics, school performance, and air quality, among other things. 
These data were supplemented with a variety of zip-code and neighborhood characteristics.   
The Hedonic Regression with Geographic Fixed Effects 
 The first-stage hedonic faces two main challenges.  The first is to define the fixed effects.  
The second is to account for locational characteristics that vary at the level of an individual 
26 
observation.  The Brasington data set provides extensive information at the census-block-group 
(CBG) level.  A CBG is a small unit of geography, so it is ideal for using as a neighborhood.  In 
some cases, however, a school district or cuts across a CBG.  As a result, I break up CBG’s that 
fall into more than one school district.  My results are based on CBG/school units (still called 
CBGs for conciseness) with at least two observed house sales. 
Six locational variables vary within a CBG: distance to worksites, to the nearest public 
elementary school, to the nearest private school, to the nearest environmental hazard, to Lake 
Erie, to the nearest black ghetto, and to the Cleveland airport.  Because the hedonic equation 
includes CBG fixed effects, these variables are specified to measure only within-CBG variation.  
For the last five variables, this variation is defined by the difference between each distance for 
the individual house and the distance for the house’s CBG.  This approach is equivalent to 
including the exponential of these distances, multiplied by a parameter, in equation (31). 
 The specification of the worksite variables comes from standard urban theory, but to 
preserve the simplicity of the first-stage hedonic, the derivations rely on simpler forms than the 
ones used above.  The first step is to identify worksites.  After plotting (by latitude and 
longitude) zip-codes containing at least 8,000 jobs (as measured by the number of employees),24 
I identified five clusters of zip codes with at least 20,000 jobs and defined them as Cleveland’s 
worksites.  These worksites contained 74.5 percent of the jobs in the Cleveland metropolitan 
area.  Figure 5 presents a map of job and worksite locations.  Finally, I specified the center of 
each worksite as the employment-weighted centroid of the zip codes in the relevant set. 
 The second step is to assign houses (and CBGs) to worksites.  My approach is to use 
standard (but simplified) urban theory to express bid functions around each work site and then, 
following Wieand (1987) and Yinger (1992), to define the boundary between two worksites as 
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the set of locations at which the bid functions for the two worksites meet.  With a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function, the bid function for worksite i can be written: 
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 (31) 
where α is the share of income (after commuting costs) spent on housing, k is a constant that 
depends on α, *iU is the utility level achieved by people working at worksite i, and u, Y, and t are 
distance, income, and per-mile commuting cost.  All households at a given worksite are assumed 
to be identical.  Each household in the sample is assigned to the worksite associated with the 
highest bid at that household’s location. 
The value of ui in equation (31) is the distance from a house in the sample to the center of 
a worksite based on latitude and longitude.25  The value of ui for a CBG is set equal to the 
distance from the center of that CBG to the center of the worksite assigned to the largest number 
of houses in the sample in that CBG.26  To make these worksite assignments, Yi is set equal to 
annual payroll per employee for worksite i (an employment-weighted average over the relevant 
zip-codes) divided by 220 (to turn it into a daily amount).  Following Lipman (2006), α is set at 
25 percent (rounded from her estimate for 2000 of 27.5 percent for households in 28 
metropolitan areas).  In addition, I assume that one-way commuting cost per mile (half of ti) 
equals operating cost per mile plus the value of commuting time (as a share of the hourly wage) 
multiplied by the hourly wage (Yi/8) and divided by commuting speed.  According to the U.S, 
Department of Transportation (2008), operating cost in 2000 was 12.2 cents per mile.  Following 
Small, Winston, and Yan (2005), the value of commuting time is set at 90 percent of the wage 
rate (rounded from their estimate of 93 percent).  Following Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport 
(2008), commuting speed is set at 37.5 MPH. 
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 All that remains is to select the value of *iU .  Raising 
*
iU  lowers the bids for worksite i 
and therefore lowers the number of houses assigned to that worksite.  My approach is to vary the 
values of *iU for the five worksites until the share of employed people assigned to each worksite 
equals the share of jobs at that worksite based on the Zip-code data.27  The number of employed 
people assigned to a worksite is the sum of the employed people in each of the CBGs assigned to 
that worksite.  I do not observe employment directly.  Instead, I approximate employment in 
each CBG as total population multiplied by the share of people between ages 18 and 64 years 
old, multiplied by one minus the unemployment rate.  These employment calculations are based 
on all households in a CBG, not just on the households in the sample. 
 Once a worksite has been selected for each house in the sample, the first term of equation 
(31) is not relevant for the hedonic regression.  Since the first term does not vary within a CBG 
(indeed, it does not vary for an entire worksite), it drops out of the hedonic with CBG fixed 
effects, and all that appears is the second term—with a value of u that is determined by its 
assignment to a worksite.  The end product of all this work, therefore, is a series of 5 variables, 
each defined by the second term in the above equation, indexed by worksite: (Yi-ti ui).    To keep 
all variation associated with a CBG in the estimated fixed effects, this term is expressed relative 
to the comparable term for the CBG, which is (Yi-ti *iu ), where 
*
iu is the distance to the worksite 
from the center of the CBG.  Because the hedonic is specified in multiplicative form, these terms 
are logged and their coefficients can be interpreted as (1/αi).   
The definitions of the variables for the basic hedonic are presented in Table 1, and the 
results are presented in Table 2.  The hedonic is estimated with the “areg” option in STATA 
based on 22,857 observations.  The R-squared is 0.7899.  The housing characteristics are, with 
the exception of “One Story,” highly significant with the expected sign. The set of 1,685 
29 
geographic fixed effects is also highly significant (p=0.000).  Of particular note are the 
commuting variables, which all are significant at the 0.1 percent level.  Their coefficients are all 
close to 3.0, which has the reasonable implication that α, the share of income spending on H, is 
about one-third.  Additional significant impacts on housing prices come from the distance from 
an environmental hazard (positive) and from Lake Erie (negative)..  
The Housing Bid Envelope 
 The second equation is the housing bid envelope.  The dependent variable is the set of 
coefficients for the CBG fixed effects.  Hence, the number of observations, 1,685, is the number 
of CBGs with at least two observations.   
The first step in estimating the bid envelope is to find the commuting time between each 
CBG and its assigned worksite.  The Brasington data include the average commuting time in the 
CBG of full time workers who do not work at home.  The procedures given earlier lead to a 
distance from the center of the CBG to the assigned worksite.  My approach is to use regression 
to connect these two and then to predict commuting time based solely on distance to worksite.   
This step is important: As shown by Yinger (1993), using straight-line distance can lead to large 
measurement errors if locations that are equidistant from a worksite in terms of straight-line 
distance are not equidistance along actual roads.28  Measurement errors can also arise if 
commuting speeds are not the same in all directions.   
This analysis begins with dummy variables for each quadrant around each worksite 
(northeast, southeast, and so on).  The use of quadrants fits Cleveland, which has transit and bus 
lines running to the northeast, southeast, and southwest out of downtown.29  Then I regress 
commuting time on distance to the assigned worksite with a separate coefficient for each 
quadrant and with several control variables to account for commuting to nearby jobs.  This 
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regression is used to predict commuting time based on distance from worksite alone, which is T 
in equation (28).30  The implicit commuting speeds that result from this procedure are correlated 
with income and the income elasticity of per-mile commuting costs  is 0.8436, which implies 
that normal sorting could occur even with γ < 1. 
The second step is to select service and “amenity” variables.  As indicated in Table 3, I 
selected six of these variables: school district test scores, a high school quality indicator, safety, 
distance to the nearest environmental hazard, and two measures of ethnic composition.  The test 
score variable measures to the ninth-grade passing rate on the five examinations (mathematics, 
reading, writing, science, and citizenship) that form the basis of the state’s accountability 
system.31  The high school variable is the ratio of the share of students receiving a high-pass on 
state tests in grade 12 to the drop-out rate, which is defined as drop-outs in a year relative to the 
district’s enrollment in grades 7-12.  This measure focuses on the extremes, that is, on the extent 
to which a district produces many top students (the numerator) or fails to serve many poor 
students (the denominator).  These two school measures are both averaged over the two school 
years preceding 2000, namely, 1997-98 and 1998-99.  The safety measure is one minus the crime 
rate, which equals total crimes per thousand people.  The ethnic composition measures are the 
inverse of the percent black and of the percent Hispanic in the CBG. 
Table 3 also lists the tax variables.  I observe the school income tax rate, but this variable 
equals zero for most school districts and exhibits little variation elsewhere.  As a result, I do not 
attempt to estimate the envelope for this variable but instead simply include it in the regression 
as a control. Ohio requires assessment at market value so the nominal property rates are roughly 
equivalent to effective rates.32  Most school districts coincide with cities.  I observe the school 
tax rate, the gross city tax rate (which includes school taxes), and the net city tax rate (which 
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reflects exemptions from property taxes).  These data lead to four property-tax variables:  the 
school tax rate, the tax rate for non-school city services, the reduction in the tax rate due to 
exemptions, and an indicator for non-city districts, about 15 percent of the sample, for which the 
latter two rates are not observed. 
The third step is to define a series of neighborhood control variables.  These variables 
could also be considered amenities, but they are all either dummy variables or interactions with 
dummy variables so they have a value of zero for many CBGs and are therefore unsuitable for 
the functional forms derived earlier.33  As shown in Table 4, these variables include worksite and 
county fixed effects, as well as indicators of location near a wide range of factors that might 
influence housing prices.34    
A few variables require special comment. The eastern suburbs of Cleveland receive 
unusual amounts of snow.  The snow-belt variables are designed to determine the extent to which 
prices are different in locations with particularly heavy snowfall.  Snowfall maps from the years 
just preceding 2000 indicate that the heaviest snows are east of the town of Pepper Pike and 
about 10 miles from Lake Erie.35 The quadratic specification of these variables estimates the 
distance from the lake at which the peak price in these eastern suburbs appears.  The ghetto 
variables were defined by first plotting all CBGs with at least 80 percent black and then 
identifying large clusters of these CBGs.  Two such clusters were found and the population-
weighted latitude and longitude of their centers were calculated.  A similar approach was applied 
to air pollution.  I identified CBGs where unusually high amounts of pollutants were released 
into the air.  The vast majority of these locations were clustered in three locations.  I found the 
pollution-weighted centers of these three clusters and measured distance for each CBG to the 
nearest cluster.  The final variables measure whether a CBG was less than 20 miles to the nearest 
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cluster and the distance from the cluster if it was within 20 miles.  These air-pollution variables 
were interacted with direction (northeast, southeast, and so on) to account for the possibility that 
air pollution is affected by wind direction. 
 These steps make it possible to estimate the full bid function envelope, equation (30) 
without H{X}.  This equation is difficult to estimate in its full non-linear glory, so I assume that 
ν = -1.0.  With this assumption, the left sides of equations (20) and (28) are replaced by log{V} 
and the (1+ν) terms disappear from the right side.  This assumption also makes it possible to 
estimate a coefficient for the property tax variables using the approximation that ln{r+βτ}≈ ln{r} 
+ (β/r)τ.  Second, I assume that γ = 1.0.  This assumption leads to simplified versions of the 
commuting time variables. These assumed housing elasticities are somewhat larger in absolute 
value than most estimates (Zabel 2004); a later section provides rough checks on their validity.  
The model was estimated with nonlinear least squares (using the STATA “nl” procedure 
with the “hc3” option to obtain robust standard errors).  Starting values were found through a 
grid-search procedure to find the lowest sum of squared errors (SSE) for various values of the six 
price elasticities, one for each service or “amenity.”  For the safety variable, the lowest SSE was 
consistently found to be at -1, which calls for a different functional form.  As a result, my final 
estimates assume that this elasticity is -1 and make no attempt to estimate its standard error.36   
I estimated the model with different assumed integer values for σ3, which influences the 
quality of the approximation for the ψ{S} function. Raising the value of σ3  appears to improve 
the approximation slightly, as indicated by the SSE, but it also raises the correlation between the 
two variables for each amenity and therefore makes estimation more difficult.  The model starts 
to break down (as indicated by an inability to estimate a standard error for the constant term) 
when σ3  reaches 6 and breaks down entirely (an inability to estimate most standard errors) when 
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σ3 reaches 10.  Somewhat surprisingly, however, the results are similar for different values of σ3, 
at least when the model can be estimated. 
 
Empirical Results 
The main results are presented in Table 5 (service, amenity, tax, and commuting 
variables) and Table 6 (geographic controls).  The first column of Table 5 presents results for a 
standard specification in which the service/amenity variables are entered linearly.  All of these 
variables except the safety variable are statistically significant.  In the second column, which sets 
all the price elasticities to -1, both terms are significant for all the service/amenity variables 
except the test-score variable.  The remaining three columns estimate the full model with various 
values for σ3.  All of the estimated elasticities increase slightly in absolute value as σ3 goes up. 
Consider the fourth column, which is based on a quadratic approximation to the ψ{S} 
function (σ3=2).  All of the service/amenity elasticities (except the one for safety which, as 
indicated earlier is assumed to be -1) are highly significant and less than 1.0 in absolute value.  
The elasticity is -0.134 for Test Scores, -0.623 for High School, -0.320 for Distance to Hazard 
and -0.358 for both ethnic composition variables.  Moreover, the estimated values for the σ1 
coefficients are statistically significant in every case.  As discussed earlier, the signs of the σ2 
coefficients provide tests of the hypothesis that sorting is based on the slope of the underlying 
bid functions.  A positive sign supports this hypothesis, whereas a negative sign rejects it.  The 
estimated values for the σ2 coefficients all have a positive sign, but they are significant at the 5 
percent level only for High School and Non Hispanic.  These results therefore support the sorting 
hypothesis in these two cases but do not reject it for any case. 
Most of the other variables in Table 5 perform as expected.  With the full specification, 
both of the commuting time variables are statistically significant, as are two of the three property 
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tax variables.  The coefficients of the property tax variables equal the degree of capitalization (β) 
divided by the discount rate (r).  With r = 3 percent, the significant results in the last three 
columns indicate a fairly low β of 8 to 10 percent.37   The insignificance of the school tax rate is 
surprising and may indicate a correlation between this rate and unmeasured school quality.  The 
weak significance of the income tax rate is not so surprising given its limited variation. 
Figures 6 and 7 plot the estimated envelopes and illustrative underlying bid functions 
(equation (20)).38  Figure 6 presents these functions for the school variables, Safety, and Distance 
from Hazard.  The first and fourth panels (for Test Scores and Distance to Hazard) have similar 
shapes; they indicate that the neighborhoods with the lowest values of these variables have much 
lower prices than other neighborhoods, but that the price impact of these variables is fairly small 
once a moderate level of the service/amenity is reached.  For Test Scores, moving from the 
minimum value (17.2) to the mean value (55.0) raises the envelope by 252.1 percent and the 
illustrated bid function by four times as much.  In contrast, moving from the mean to the 
maximum (91.0) raises the envelope by only 1.18 percent and hardly affects the illustrated bid.  
The effects of Distance to Hazard are much smaller.  Moving from a very low value (0.1 miles) 
to the mean value (0.98 miles) raises the envelope by 14.5 percent, but moving from the mean to 
the maximum (4.9 miles) raises it by only 0.8 percent.  One curious feature of both these figures 
is that the envelopes (and hence the underlying bid functions) have a negative slope for the 
lowest observed values of the service or amenity.  This does not appear to be a substantive result, 
however, as it applies to only 30 observations in the case of Test Scores and only 10 observations 
in the case of Distance to Hazard.  
The second panel reveals a different pattern for High School.  Raising the high school 
variable from its median value (3.54, which is about the minimum point on the envelope) to its 
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maximum (177.2) raises the bid envelope by 26.9 percent and would raise bids on the illustrated 
bid function by 43.2 percent.  Below the median value of this variable, however, the envelope 
has a negative slope.  Going from the minimum to the median value would lower the envelope 
by 37.5 percent.  This result demonstrates the importance of accounting for household 
heterogeneity.  In about half of the neighborhoods in this sample, improved high school quality, 
as measured by High School, leads to higher housing prices.  These results also imply, however, 
that the people who live in school districts with the poorest high school quality would rather see 
their schools provide other types of outcomes (holding tax rates constant).  Because High School 
focuses on the extremes, one possibility is that parents in these schools would rather see a 
concentration on students in the middle of the distribution that on students at the top and bottom. 
I explore these issues further in the following section. 
The third panel of Figure 6 shows that Safety also has a positive impact on house values 
except at the bottom of the Safety distribution. Going from a value of 0.894 (the minimum point 
on the envelope and the 25th percentile of the Safety distribution) to the maximum value (0.999), 
raises the envelope by 9.9 percent.  As shown in the figure, increased safety has a small negative 
impact on the envelope below a value of 0.894.39  As in the case of High School, these results 
demonstrate the extent of heterogeneity in household preferences.  Apparently some households 
would like their city to shift resources away from safety toward other (unspecified) things. 
Figure 7 presents results for the ethnicity variables.  The first panel shows that the bid 
envelope declines with percent black up to a neighborhood composition of 75 percent black.  
More specifically, going from zero to 75 percent black lowers the envelope by 27.1 percent, 
whereas going from 75 to 100 percent black raises the envelope by 2.9 percent.  These results 
support the view that households have heterogeneous preferences for black neighbors and are 
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illustrated by the two bid functions in this figure, one for a household type that prefers white 
neighborhoods and the other for a household type that prefers black neighborhoods.  As shown in 
Table 6, location in or near the black ghetto also lowers housing prices, but these effects are not 
significant at the 5 percent level, at least not with my specification.  The second panel of Figure 6 
reveals a strikingly similar pattern for neighborhood Hispanic composition. Moving from zero to 
49 percent Hispanic lowers the envelope by 37.2 percent, but moving from 49 to 63 percent 
Hispanic (the maximum composition in the sample) raises the envelope by 2.6 percent.  These 
results support the hypothesis that the Hispanic composition of a neighborhood is a negative 
amenity for some households and a positive amenity for others. 
Table 6 presents results for the geographic controls.  Housing prices are significantly 
higher within two miles of Lake Erie.  The coefficients of the two snowbelt variables imply a 
maximum positive impact on housing prices about 10 miles from Lake Erie in the eastern 
suburbs, which is exactly where snowfall is the greatest.  Housing prices are higher within 10 
miles of the airport, but this effect fades to zero by the time 10 miles is reached.  Housing prices 
decline with the dumping of pollutants onto land in the neighborhood and are lower in locations 
within 20 miles to the northeast or southwest of a major air pollutions site (an effect that declines 
with distance from the site).  Housing prices are boosted by neighborhood amenities and by 
location near a regional airport, but are lowered by location near a railroad. 
Recovering Demand Parameters 
The estimated coefficients in Table 5 can be used to calculate ψ for each observation 
(using equation (19)) and then to estimate equation (13).40  This step is complicated by the 
negative values of ψ for some observations for every service or amenity.  In three cases (Test 
Scores, Distance to Hazard, and Non Hispanic), the number of observations with negative values 
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for ψ is small so these observations are simply dropped.  In the other cases, however, this 
procedure does not make sense.  Because equation (13) is specified as a multiplicative function, 
a negative value for ψ implies that one of the variables in the equation must be negative.  For 
example, ψ might depend on the difference between unemployment in a CBG and the average 
unemployment rate in the sample—a difference that is negative for some CBGs.  
This type of model can be estimated with an endogenous switching regression (Lokshin 
and Sajaia 2004), which has been developed for problems such as estimating wage equations in 
the public and private sectors.41  The “switch” in this case is between positive and negative value 
for ψ.  This approach simultaneously estimates three equations:  ln(ψ) as a function of household 
demand traits, Z  (at the CBG level), when ψ is positive; ln(-ψ) as a function of  Z when ψ is 
negative; and the sign of the ψ (1=negative; 0=positive) as the realization of a latent variable that 
depends on Z and other household traits.  This model reveals which household traits are 
associated with a negative value for ψ (that is, with a negative marginal valuation for the 
associated service or amenity), and then estimates the demand parameters in equation (13) 
separately for households with positive and negative marginal valuations. 
As shown earlier, the income elasticities estimated using equation (13) provide a test of 
normal sorting, that is, of the hypothesis that –(θ/μ + γ) > 0.  Two versions of this test are 
possible: the standard test based on the net income elasticity from a model with full controls, and 
a test of equation (29) based on the gross income elasticity from a model with no controls.  
Results for these tests in Table 7 confirm normal sorting for the two school variables, Safety, and 
Distance to Hazard.  The net income elasticities for locations with negative ψ also confirm 
normal sorting for High School but contradict it for Safety.  Neither of these results remains 
significant, however, when the impacts of other variables correlated with income are considered.  
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Finally, this table indicates that among households that prefer a white neighborhood, the 
marginal willingness to pay for “whiteness” increases with income.  Among households that 
prefer a black neighborhood, however, the gross income elasticity indicates that the marginal 
willingness to pay for “blackness” declines with income. 
The endogenous switching regressions used to derive the results in Table 7 (but not 
presented separately) also reveal something about the household characteristics significantly 
associated with downward-sloping bid functions for High School, Safety, and Non Black—and 
further reinforce the need to consider household heterogeneity.  The probability of a negative ψ  
for High School increases with a CBG’s unemployment rate and its share of students in private 
school (elementary and high school) and decreases with the share of the CBG’s population that is 
married, has children, has advanced education, or has a blue collar job.  These results are 
consistent with the view that the value of ψ for High School is most likely to be negative among 
groups that do not highly value public education. In the case of Safety, the probability of a 
negative ψ increases with a CBG’s unemployment rate and decreases with the share of a CBGs 
population that is married, has advanced education, has children, or is elderly.  These results are 
consistent with the view that families and the elderly value safety, but that people who are 
unemployed have different priorities.  Finally, a negative slope for the Non Black is less likely 
for CBGs in which a relatively large share of the workers have blue collar jobs share or a 
relatively large share of the students go to private elementary school.  These two variables are 
plausible indicators of prejudice against blacks. 
 
Conclusions 
 In contrast to Taylor (2008), who writes “Because the hedonic price function is an 
envelope function, there is no theoretical guidance for its specification” (p. 20), this paper takes 
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the view that the functional form of the housing price function can be derived precisely because 
it is an envelope.  Using constant elasticity demand functions for services/amenities and housing, 
I derive an individual household’s bid function for housing with many service and amenity 
measures, with varying access to worksites, and with local income and property taxes.  Then I 
derive the housing bid envelope that arises when the underlying demands for services/amenities 
and housing vary across households.  This envelope has a specific form that can be estimated. 
 This approach has three main advantages.  First, it is based on a general characterization 
of household heterogeneity, which accounts for variation in both observable and unobservable 
factors in the demand functions for services/amenities and housing.  Second, it yields estimates 
of the price elasticities of demand for services and amenities directly from the hedonic estimation 
and does not require a Rosen two-step procedure.  In other words, once the envelope has been 
estimated, it is possible to draw the bid functions (and do benefit calculations) for the households 
receiving any given level of the service or amenity.  Third, it provides direct tests of the 
hypotheses that households sort according to the slopes of their bid functions and that higher-
income households win the competition for locations with more desirable amenities. 
 This approach was implemented using data from Cleveland in 2000.  The regressions, 
which control for a wide range of neighborhood characteristics, indicate a strong impact on 
housing prices from six different public services or “amenities”: school test scores, a measure of 
high school quality, safety, distance from an environmental hazard, percent non black, and 
percent non Hispanic.  Preliminary tests led me to assume that the price elasticity of demand for 
safety is -1.0, but price elasticities ranging from -0.13 to -0.62, all precisely estimated, were 
obtained for the other five variables. 
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 The estimated bid envelopes and underlying bid functions exhibit several different 
shapes.  For Test Scores and Distance to Hazard, moving from the lowest level of the 
service/amenity to an intermediate level substantially raises housing prices (and underlying bids), 
but additional movement beyond this point has little additional impact. In the case of the other 
service/amenities, the impact of amenity increases on housing prices does not fade out at high 
levels of the service/amenity. Moreover, the results consistently indicate that some households 
consider these so-called amenities to be disamenities; these households sort into the locations 
where the “amenity” has the lowest value and lower their housing bids when the “amenity” goes 
up.  This finding demonstrates that household demands are heterogeneous in both observable and 
unobservable ways and that methods unable to account for this heterogeneity are likely to yield 
biased results.  Additional analysis of the household traits associated with this type of switch in 
valuation provides support for this interpretation.  The households most likely not to value 
improvements in high school quality, for example, are families without children, with little 
education, or with children in private school.  These results also confirm what surveys have long 
indicated, namely, that some households prefer largely white neighborhoods, whereas others 
prefer neighborhoods in which blacks or Hispanics are concentrated.  
 Finally, the results in this paper provide strong support for the standard model of 
household bidding and sorting.  Results for two “amenities” (high school quality and Hispanic 
composition) confirm the theorem that households sort into locations according to the slopes of 
their bid functions.  Moreover, the estimated income elasticities confirm the theorem that sorting 
is “normal,” with higher-income households sorting into locations with more desirable services 
and amenities. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 I prefer the term “ethnic” to “racial,” because it emphasizes that distinctions among groups in a 
society are socially created, even if they draw on superficial physical traits, such as skin color. 
2 This approach, developed in Wheaton (1993), is equivalent to the indirect utility function 
approach in Epple et al. (1984, 1993). 
3 An informal version of this result is in Yinger (1982), who observes that with sorting the 
difference in housing prices (per unit of H) between a rich and a poor jurisdiction “does not 
measure the valuation by either rich or poor households of the difference in service levels 
between the two jurisdictions” (p. 925). 
4 A person’s racial/ethnic attitudes are simultaneously determined with his or her experiences. 
For a thoughtful demonstration of this simultaneity, see Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi (2004). 
5 This condition holds for any utility function so long as the labor-leisure choice does not alter 
the value of time as a fraction of the wage (as virtually all urban models assume). 
6 Mills (1972) was the first to use a constant elasticity housing demand function in deriving 
P{u}.  Kim and McDonald (1987) show that Mills mistakenly uses Y instead of (Y - tu) as the 
income term.  For the sake of consistency, (Y – tu) should be the income concept in (7), too, but 
this change would lead to the same type of problem that arises if the demand for Si is a function 
of Sj. Thus, I assume that households ignore tu in their demand for S (but not for H!). 
7 Many empirical studies include distance or time to work as an explanatory variable in the 
hedonic equation, without a theoretically derived functional form (Black 1999; Brasington 2002; 
Downes and Zabel 2002).  Exceptions include Yinger (1979) and Coulson (1991).   
8 The Beckman/Montesano approach is equivalent to the derivation of an envelope based on their 
assumed income distribution, but it cannot accommodate other household traits.  
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9 As in the case of commuting distance, changing the income concept in previous derivations to 
Y(1-y) would add consistency but also cause problems for the derivation.  Because y never 
exceeds 1 percent, I assume that household demands for S and H can be written without (1-y).  
10  Similarly, estimation of the σT parameters makes it possible to solve equation (27) for ψT and 
to estimate equation (26).  This step is not attempted in this paper. 
11 See also Wheaton (1993) and Yinger (1993). 
12 If the terms containing ν are moved to the left side, the left side of equations (19), (20), and 
(28) takes the Box-Cox form.  Moreover, if σ3 is large, the two S terms on the right side of (19) 
and (28) simplify to a single Box-Cox term. 
13 Several studies also have applied spatial statistics to the estimation of a hedonic equation 
(Brasington 2004, Brasington and Hite 2005).  These techniques usually have little impact on the 
estimated implicit prices.  A few scholars go even farther and argue that a house’s price depends 
on the sales prices of nearby houses (Kim, Phipps, and Anselin 2003). 
14 This approach (1) limits sample size by ignoring houses far from boundaries; (2) controls for 
omitted variables not obviously correlated with S (because these traits are shared by two 
locations with different values of S); and (3) fails to recognize that sorting based on S limits the 
number of shared traits across boundaries (Kane, Riegg, and Staiger 2006. p. 194). Direct 
controls for neighborhood traits are needed, too (Bayer, Ferriera, and McMillan (2007). 
15 Bajari and Kahn (2005) implicitly consider sorting by allowing marginal willingness to pay for 
each amenity to vary with household characteristics.  
16 Walsh (2007) uses an approach similar to Epple and Sieg (1999) to estimate the relationship 
between property values and open space, which is a type of amenity. 
17 Further discussion of their methods can be found in Bayer and Timmins (2005, 2007). 
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18 Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004) show that the method used by Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 
(2007) yields inconsistent estimates unless the number of households increases at a faster rate 
than the number of houses.  Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan acknowledge this point, but argue 
that it is not a problem because it is “reasonable” to suppose “that that the number of individuals 
increases fast enough relative to the number of truly distinct housing types in the market ” (p. 
634).  It is not clear to me why this supposition is reasonable.   
19 This formulation leaves off several terms in the Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan formulation, 
their equation (2), including distance to work, their border dummy variables, and unobserved 
housing or neighborhood traits, all of which can be treated as X’s for the purposes of this 
discussion.  Their formulation also includes an error term, which is omitted here for simplicity.    
20 A similar point applies to Bajari and Kahn (2005).  Their utility function is linear in the 
composite good and in the log of amenities. The implied bid function for household type i (with 
a single X) is Pi= (Yi-Ui0)+βi(ln{X}).  Following the same steps as in the text (with the 
assumption ln{Xi}=σ1+σ2bi) leads to the same envelope with ln{X} replacing X.  As a result, the 
envelope implied by the Bajari and Kahn assumptions contains ln{X} and [ln{X}]2.  The squared 
term is not included in their hedonic equation, which is estimated with local linear regression. 
21 The footnotes to Table 7 indicate that Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan estimated annualized 
housing price as a function of the X’s, including distance to work and their border fixed effects 
(their equation (10)).  Their discussion on pages 620 and 621 and the title of Table 7 suggest, 
however, that they used a house-specific fixed effect from their multinomial choice model, called 
delta, as the dependent variable with price (instrumented) on the right side (their equation (5)).  
The latter approach yields the MWTP of a household with average values of all the household 
traits in their data (income, children, race, education), but only if αji (the coefficient of the 
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amenity) is divided by αhi (the coefficient of the price variable).  Their Table 7 does not present 
results for the price variable and no mention of this adjustment appears in the article.  
22 Another approach to sorting with household heterogeneity is provided by Hoyt and Rosenthal 
(1997).  They compare hedonic equations that have fixed effects for small neighborhood units 
with hedonic equations that have the same fixed effects and are differenced over time (to remove 
household fixed effects).  The results of the two approaches are very similar, which is consistent 
with sorting, that is, with equal household unobservables within neighborhoods.  
23 As explained by Borjas (1987), the standard errors for these second-stage coefficients need to 
be corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
24 The zip code data comes from the U.S. Census web site.  The employment and payroll data are 
for 2004 (2000 were not available for downloading); the other zip-code data are for 2000. 
25  Many workers do not commute to the worksite center.  Ross and Yinger (1995) show that this 
situation can be analyzed with a housing bid function based on distance or time to the center and 
a wage gradient that decreases with distance between the center and a worker’s job site. 
26 In the single case of a tie, the CBG was assigned to the larger of the two worksites. 
27 I adjust *iU until, for each worksite, the two shares differ by less than 1 percentage point. 
28 Bajari and Kahn (2005) and Bayer, Ferriera, and McMillan (2007) use time to work as their 
commuting variable without considering work location.  This approach runs the risk of 
endogeneity bias whenever unobserved determinants of job location, and hence of distance or 
time to work, are correlated with housing or neighborhood traits. 
29 Maps are available from the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority:  
http://www.gcrta.org/maps-schedules.asp. 
30 An appendix explaining these procedures and regression results is available from the author.   
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31 Preliminary tests yielded almost identical results with test scores averaged over grades 3, 6, 
and 9.  I also examined a value-added measure made possible by the fact that the data set 
includes 4th grade scores in 1997-98 and 6th grade scores in 1999-2000, which applied to the 
same cohort (except, of course, for movement in and out of the district).  A preliminary 
examination of this variable duplicate the finding in Brasington and Haurin (2006; based on the 
same data) and Downes and Zabel (2002) that this service measure does not affect house values. 
32 I obtained assessment-sales ratios for 2005 to 2008.  They appeared to be reasonably accurate: 
the 2005 ratios averaged 82.2 percent, the ratios were highly correlated across time, and the 
ratios had little variance (less than 6 percent of the mean).  These ratios were not significant in 
preliminary regressions regardless of how they were averaged over time, so I treat nominal rates 
as effective rates.  The Brasington data contained school tax rates.  Other rates and assessment-
sales ratios came from http://tax.ohio.gov/channels/research/property_tax_statistics.stm. 
33 The variables indicating distance to public and private schools could be specified as 
continuous variables and treated as amenities, but preliminary tests found no gain in explanatory 
power from such an approach compared to using the variables defined in Table 3. 
34 An appendix explaining the data collection procedures is available from the author. 
35 Cleveland snowfall maps are available from the National Weather Service at 
http://www.erh.noaa.gov/cle/climate/info/snowinfo.html . 
36 If the price elasticity for safety is not assumed to be -1, its estimated value is -0.989 with a 
very small standard error.  However, the SSE is lower when this elasticity is assumed to be -1. 
37 Correcting for the average assessment-sales ratio in 2005 (see note 32) would raise these 
estimates by about 2 percentage points.  In 2000, the national average rate for a fixed-rate 30-
year mortgage was 8.06 (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/MORTG.txt). Table 3 indicates 
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an appreciation rate for houses in Cleveland of 0.017 percent per day or [(1+0.00017)365-1] = 6.4 
percent per year.  These figures suggest a real interest rate, r, of 8.06 - 6.4 = 1.66 percent, which 
I rounded up to 3.0 for the calculations in the text.   
38 These figures use regressions with σ3=2; figures for other values are virtually the same. 
39 This statement and Figure 6 omit 9 observations with a value of Safety below 0.76.  Going 
from a value of 0.894 to the a value of 0.85 (the lowest value above these outliers) raises housing 
prices by 1.6 percent; going all the way to the minimum value raises prices by 27.1 percent.  
40 It is also possible to test the condition in (29) by estimating (26) without controls and the value 
of χ in the text (0.8436).  This test supports normal sorting around three worksites, rejects normal 
sorting for one worksite, and neither supports nor rejects normal sorting for one worksite.  
Estimating (26) with the controls in the note to Table 7 yields a small, insignificant value for the 
log of income, which supports the assumption that γ = 1.  In addition, I estimated equation (30) 
with a Box-Cox specification on the left side (defined as rent using r = 0.03 and the tax terms 
with their estimated coefficients) and right side variables defined by the estimated elasticities 
presented in the text.  The estimated Box-Cox parameter, (1+ν) in this case, is -0.124, which 
indicates ν = -1.124.  This suggests that assuming ν = -1 may be a reasonable approximation.   
41 An appendix that provides a formal explanation of the endogenous switching regressions along 
with detailed estimation results is available from the author. 
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Figure 1:  Deriving the Bid-Function Envelope
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Figure 2.  Bid Functions for School Quality
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent Passing
B
id
 P
er
 U
ni
t o
f H
ou
si
ng
 S
er
vi
ce
s
55 
 
Figure 3.  Supply and Demand for School Quality 
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Figure 6. Estimated Envelopes for Public Service and Amenity Variables 
 
 
  
0 50 100
L
og
{P
}
Test Scores
L
og
{P
}
High School (Log Scale)
0.85 0.9 0.95 1
L
og
{P
}
Safety (=1 - Crime Rate)
0 2 4 6
L
og
{P
}
Distance to Nearest Hazard
59 
 
Figure 7. Estimated Envelopes for Ethnicity Variables 
 
 
 
 
  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
L
og
{P
}
Percent Black
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
L
og
{P
}
Percent Hispanic
60 
 
Table 1.  Variable Definitions for Basic Hedonic with Neighborhood Fixed Effects 
 
Variable 
 
Definition 
  
One Story House has one story 
Brick House is made of bricks 
Basement House has a finished basement 
Garage House has a detached garage 
Air Cond. House has central air conditioning 
Fireplace Number of fireplaces 
Bedrooms Number of bedrooms 
Full Baths Number of full bathrooms 
Part Baths Number of partial bathrooms 
Age of House Log of the age of the house 
House Area Log of square feet of living area 
Lot Area Log of lot size 
Outbuilding Number of outbuildings 
Porch House has a porch  
Deck House has a deck 
Pool House has a pool 
Date of Sale Date of house sale (January 1=1, December 31=365) 
Commute ia Commuting variable: Log of (Y-tu) for house minus log of (Y-tu) for 
CBG, worksite i 
Public Schoola Distance to nearest public elementary school (house minus CBG) 
Private School Distance to nearest private school (house minus CBG) 
Distance to Hazard Distance to nearest environmental hazard (house minus CBG) 
Distance to Eriea Distance to Lake Erie (if less than 1; house minus CBG) 
Distance to Ghettoa  Distance to black ghetto (if less than 5; house minus CBG) 
Distance to Airporta Distance to Cleveland airport (if less than 10; house minus CBG) 
a Variable added to the original Brasington data set 
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Table 2.  Results for Basic Hedonic Regression for Cleveland in 2000 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-stat. P>|t|
One Story -0.00673 0.00496 -1.36 0.175
Brick 0.01525 0.00522 2.92 0.004
Basement 0.03154 0.00505 6.24 0.000
Garage 0.13947 0.00673 20.72 0.000
Air Cond. 0.02656 0.00552 4.81 0.000
Fireplaces 0.03162 0.00378 8.37 0.000
Bedrooms -0.00826 0.00285 -2.90 0.004
Full Baths 0.05997 0.00425 14.10 0.000
Part Baths 0.04175 0.00413 10.10 0.000
Age of House -0.08288 0.00322 -25.71 0.000
House Area 0.42395 0.00860 49.32 0.000
Lot Area 0.08353 0.00367 22.76 0.000
Outbuildings 0.13706 0.03987 3.44 0.001
Porch 0.03316 0.00727 4.56 0.000
Deck 0.05429 0.00526 10.32 0.000
Pool 0.09191 0.01793 5.13 0.000
Date of Sale 0.00017 0.00002 9.47 0.000
Commute 1 2.98197 0.66112 4.51 0.000
Commute 2 3.07895 0.68387 4.50 0.000
Commute 3 3.08602 0.68817 4.48 0.000
Commute 4 3.20417 0.71337 4.49 0.000
Commute 5 3.13709 0.69455 4.52 0.000
Public School -0.00181 0.00592 -0.31 0.759
Private School -0.01575 0.01043 -1.51 0.131
Distance to Hazard 0.02292 0.00588 3.90 0.000
Distance to Erie -0.01276 0.00485 -2.63 0.008
Distance to Ghetto -0.17101 0.09026 -1.89 0.058
Distance to Airport 0.08497 0.06294 1.35 0.177
Constant 11.38719 0.01707 667.17 0.000
Notes:  Dependent variable = log of transaction amount; 22,857 observations; R2 = .7899; 
F(28, 21144) = 455.89 (significant at 0.000 level); 1,685 fixed effects with F(1684, 
2144) = 8.45 (significant at 0.000 level); estimated with “areg” command in 
STATA. 
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Table 3: Service, “Amenity,” Commuting, and Tax Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Definition     
  
Test Scores  Average percent passing in school district in 9th grade in 5 state-specified 
tests (math, reading, writing, science, and citizenship) in 1998-99 and 1999-
2000. 
High School  Average percent of students in school district with a high pass on the 5 state 
tests in 12th grade (averaged over 1998-99 and 1999-2000) divided by the 
drop-out rate (dropouts divided by grade 7-12 enrollment and averaged over 
1998-99 and 1999-2000). 
Safety One  minus the crime rate (total offenses per 1,000 people in 1997) in CBG 
(averaged over observations in a CBG, which may be in different police 
districts). 
Hazard Distance from CBG to nearest environmental hazard 
Nonblack Inverse of percent black in CBG (with 0.01 added to the denominator to 
account for CBGs with no blacks). 
Nonhisp Inverse of percent Hispanic in CBG (with 0.01 added to the denominator to 
account for CBGs with no Hispanics). 
Commute Urban model commuting variable for CBG (defined as median family 
income in CBG minus estimated commuting cost to the worksite assigned to 
that CBG). 
Income Tax Rate School district income tax rate. 
School Tax Rate School district effective property tax rate. 
City Tax Ratea Effective city property tax rate beyond school tax. 
Tax Break Ratea Decline in effective total city effective property tax due to exemptions. 
Not Citya CBG is outside a city (previous two variables = 0). 
Notes: In the results tables, a “1” after a variable indicates that the entry is the value of σ1 for that variable; a 
“2” indicates that the entry is σ2; these terms are defined in equation (20) in the text. 
a  Variable added to the original Brasington data set . 
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Table 4: Geographic Control Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Definition     
  
Lakefront Center of CBG is within two miles of Lake Erie. 
Distance to Lake Distance in miles from center of CBG to Lake Erie (if less than 2 miles). 
Snowbelt 1 Distance in miles from center of CBG to Lake Erie if east of Pepper Pike 
(and if distance less than 10 miles). 
Snowbelt 2 Square of Snowbelt 1 
Ghetto CBG is located in one of the two black ghettos in Cleveland (contiguous 
areas with more than 80 percent black population). 
Near Ghetto Center of CBG is within 5 miles of the population-weighted center of the 
nearest ghetto (but not in the ghetto). 
Near Airport Center of CBG is within 10 miles of the center of Cleveland Hopkins 
Airport. 
Airport Distance Distance in miles from center of CBG to center of Cleveland Airport (if 
less than 10 miles 
Near Public Center of CBG is one mile or less from nearest public elementary school 
Near Private Center of CBG is one mile or less from nearest private school 
Land Release Pounds of toxic chemicals deposited on land by facilities in the CBG in 
2000 
Smog d Center of CBG is within 20 miles of the effluent-weighted geographic 
centers of one of the three concentrations of air-pollution-emitting 
facilities in the Cleveland area (in the direction indicated by “d”). 
Smog Distance d Distance in miles from the center of CBG to the effluent-weighted center 
of the nearest air pollution concentration (if less than 20 miles) (in 
direction indicated by “d”). 
Local Amenities Number of neighborhood amenities (park, golf course, river, or lake) 
within 0.25 miles of center of CBG. 
Freeway Center of CBG is within 0.25 miles of a limited-access highway. 
Railroad Center of CBG is within 0.25 miles of a railroad. 
Shopping Center of CBG is within 1 mile of a shopping center or mall. 
Hospital Center of CBG is within 1 mile of a hospital 
Small Airport Center of CBG is within 1 mile of a small airport 
Big Park Center of CBG is within 1 mile of a state, regional, or county park (or the 
Cleveland zoo). 
Notes: Except for “Land Release” and “Near Private,” all of these variables were added to the original 
Brasington data set by the author, although they were all derived using the CBG latitudes and longitudes 
in that data set and, in the case of the ghetto and smog variables, on other information in the data set, 
too. 
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Table 5:  Results for Service, "Amenity," Commuting, and Tax Variables
Standard All μ 's Estimated μ 'sc 
Modela equal -1b 3σ =1 3σ =2 3σ =9 
Test Scores 1 0.00482*** 0.25180* 18.03901*** 4.22993*** 1.37705***
(10.92) (1.98) (89.30) (94.88) (337.88) 
Test Scores 2 -0.03106 8.33E-11 6.54E-10 0.00000 
(-0.81) (0.16) (0.20) (0.22) 
Test Scores mu -1.00000 -0.11435*** -0.13369*** -0.14411*** 
(-4.39) (-4.95) (-5.00) 
High School 1 0.00119*** -0.04363** 2.65250*** 1.70458*** 1.13036*** 
(4.41) (-2.34) (5.08) (9.94) (48.23) 
High School 2 0.03624*** 15.98304*** 6.83362*** 1.26833*** 
(4.58) (2.47) (2.60) (2.73) 
High School mu -1.00000 -0.51434*** -0.62335*** -0.72511*** 
(-13.74) (-11.50) (-10.18) 
Safety 1 0.21327 -30.72455*** 0.89291*** 0.94415*** 0.98716*** 
(0.84) (-3.8) (61.35) (121.98) (557.78) 
Safety 2 130.18362*** 0.06208*** 0.03310*** 0.00764*** 
(3.79) (3.38) (3.38) (159.02) 
Safety mu -1.00000 -1.00000 -1.00000 -1.00000 
Distance to Hazard 1 0.02819*** 0.09062*** 0.08076*** 0.28467*** 0.75646*** 
(3.96) (3.59) (3.27) (6.24) (27.60) 
Distance to Hazard 2 -0.14275*** 70.39408 55.86535 19.15127 
(-2.58) (1.63) (1.62) (1.63) 
Distance to Hazard mu -1.00000 -0.28952*** -0.32046*** -0.34504*** 
(-6.04) (-5.23) (-4.79) 
Non Black 1 0.00020** 0.04947*** 0.01321*** 0.11482*** 0.61808*** 
(2.06) (8.5) (8.32) (15.32) (66.79) 
Non Black 2 -0.02742*** 241.15510* 242.79090* 110.27900* 
(-7.78) (1.99) (1.88) (1.86) 
Non Black mu -1.00000 -0.31757*** -0.35798*** -0.39012*** 
(-17.13) (-14.03) (-12.45) 
Non Hispanic 1 0.00024*** 0.04172*** 0.02050*** 0.14175*** 0.64715*** 
(2.77) (6.05) (8.26) (13.69) (57.11) 
Non Hispanic 2 -0.02115*** 115.91550*** 106.18720*** 44.52483*** 
(-5.15) (2.75) (2.62) (2.61) 
Non Hispanic mu -1.00000 -0.31543*** -0.35824*** -0.39196*** 
(-18.95) (-15.13) (-13.26) 
Commute 1 20.32068*** 17.34504*** 0.18450** 0.18779** 0.18872** 
(3.15) (2.69) (2.11) (2.19) (2.20) 
Commute 2 -21.18214*** -17.91119** 0.20542*** 0.20411*** 0.20395888***
(-2.99) (-2.52) (2.95) (2.97) (2.96) 
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Income Tax Rate 1.53928 -4.90929 -6.41500* -6.22136* -6.15772* 
 (0.45) (-1.4) (-1.77) (-1.72) (-1.73) 
School Tax Rate 1.42261 -0.86179 1.11980 1.06216 1.04468 
 (1.2) (-0.68) (0.90) (0.86) (0.87) 
City Tax Rate -2.13914* -3.10726*** 3.78116*** 3.71210*** 3.69267*** 
 (-1.86) (-2.57) (2.75) (2.70) (2.73) 
Tax Break Rate 3.06068* 5.76055*** -6.91241*** -6.84451*** -6.82630*** 
 (1.81) (3.23) (-3.35) (-3.32) (-3.35) 
Not City -0.00850 0.01034 0.03243 0.03351 0.03355 
 (-0.32) (0.38) (1.16) (1.20) (1.21) 
      
SSE 43.9972 39.2417412 37.31037 37.29866 37.29533 
R-squared 0.6222 0.663 0.6796 0.6685 0.6687 
Root MSE 0.16394 0.15511 0.1514332 0.1514094 0.1513561 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the CBG fixed effect (in log form); the number of observations is 1685; 
             the regressions in this table also include the variables in Table 6 plus worksite and county fixed effects. 
aThe results in this column are based on linear version of the service and "amenity" variables. 
bThis regression sets 3σ  = 2.  
c These regressions set μ = -1 for the safety variable 
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Table 6:  Results for Geographic Control Variables 
Standard All μ 's Estimated μ 'sc 
Modela equal -1b 3σ =1 3σ =2 3σ =9 
Lakefront 0.112646*** 0.08041*** 0.07160*** 0.07181*** 0.07182*** 
(4.01) (3.01) (2.630) (2.64) (2.64) 
Distance to Lake -0.07162*** -0.04217** -0.03210 -0.03260 -0.03280 
(-3.39) (-2.09) (-1.580) (-1.61) (-1.62) 
Snowbelt 1 0.038168*** 0.04019*** 0.03903*** 0.03899*** 0.03901*** 
(4.28) (4.48) (4.260) (4.27) (4.37) 
Snowbelt 2 -0.00168*** -0.00191*** -0.00190*** -0.00190*** -0.00191*** 
(-3.25) (-3.63) (-3.540) (-3.55) (-3.67) 
Ghetto -0.11216*** -0.08443*** -0.06626* -0.06511* -0.06463* 
(-4.81) (-3.49) (-1.880) (-1.86) (-1.85) 
Near Ghetto -0.05815*** -0.04215* -0.04444* -0.04352* -0.04316* 
(-2.74) (-1.95) (-1.930) (-1.89) (-1.88) 
Near Airport 0.176843*** 0.16758*** 0.15121*** 0.15155*** 0.15170*** 
(4.81) (4.77) (4.250) (4.25) (4.33) 
Airport Distance -0.02509*** -0.02448*** -0.01945*** -0.01962*** -0.01968*** 
(-5.9) (-6.35) (-5.070) (-5.10) (-5.14) 
Near Public -0.00014 -0.00171 -0.00364 -0.00364 -0.00361 
(-0.01) (-0.16) (-0.330) (-0.33) (-0.33) 
Near Private 0.028782* 0.02214* 0.01497 0.01458 0.01440 
(2.12) (1.75) (1.180) (1.15) (1.14) 
Land Release -5.28E-06*** 0.00000** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 
(-5.65) (-2.48) (-2.860) (-2.75) (-2.71) 
Smog NE -0.23695*** -0.23274*** -0.33621*** -0.33474*** -0.33327*** 
(-2.88) (-2.81) (-3.980) (-3.97) (-3.92) 
Smog SE  -0.14291* -0.09371 -0.18592*** -0.18607* -0.18510** 
(-1.8) (-1.22) (-2.220) (-2.23) (-2.20) 
Smog SW -0.18347** -0.16818** -0.22779*** -0.22654*** -0.22524*** 
(-2.5) (-2.15) (-2.790) (-2.77) (-2.75) 
Smog NW 0.04848 0.14579 0.01803 0.02100 0.02291 
(0.61) (1.39) (0.130) (0.15) (0.16) 
Smog Direction NE 0.01167*** 0.01134** 0.01704*** 0.01696*** 0.01689*** 
(2.63) (2.53) (3.720) (3.70) (3.65) 
Smog Direction SE 0.004248 0.00341 0.00976* 0.00984* 0.00985* 
(0.78) (0.67) (1.730) (1.75) (1.76) 
Smog Direction SW 0.007591* 0.00784* 0.01078** 0.01079** 0.01074** 
(1.75) (1.66) (2.200) (2.20) (2.18) 
Smog Direction NW -0.09881*** -0.13551*** -0.08712 -0.08775 -0.08801 
(-3.26) (-2.93) (-1.390) (-1.41) (-1.41) 
Local Amenities 0.018543** 0.01806** 0.01644** 0.01655** 0.01661** 
(2.19) (2.25) (2.040) (2.05) (2.06) 
Freeway 0.004241 0.00656 0.00782 0.00763 0.00759 
(0.33) (0.55) (0.660) (0.64) (0.64) 
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Railroad -0.04067*** -0.02422** -0.02098** -0.02085** -0.02078** 
(-3.72) (-2.26) (-1.990) (-1.97) (-1.96) 
Shopping 0.008763 0.00613 0.00309 0.00317 0.00322 
(0.89) (0.66) (0.340) (0.34) (0.35) 
Hospital -0.01973* -0.02002* -0.01357 -0.01384 -0.01393 
(-1.81) (-1.91) (-1.290) (-1.32) (-1.33) 
Small Airport 0.040574* 0.04785** 0.05839** 0.05835** 0.05832** 
(1.66) (2.13) (2.470) (2.48) (2.48) 
Big Park 0.038692*** 0.01566 0.01623 0.01624 0.01627 
(3.38) (1.46) (1.570) (1.57) (1.57) 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the CBG fixed effect (in log form); the number of observations is 1685; 
           the regressions in this table also include the variables in Table 5 plus worksite and county fixed effects. 
 aThe results in this column are based on linear version of the service and "amenity" variables. 
 bThis regression sets 3σ  = 2. 
 c These regressions set μ = -1 for the safety variable. 
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Table 7. Tests of the Normal Sorting Hypothesis 
Test 
Scores 
High 
School Safety Hazard 
Non 
Black 
Non 
Hispanic 
RESULTS WITH FULL CONTROLS (NET INCOME ELASTICITY) 
Log of Family Income 0.84539*** 1.034509*** 0.21305*** 0.1765** 1.224279*** 0.170024 
(7.81) (3.71) (2.90) (2.27) (5.55) (0.391) 
Log of Family Income if Slope 
  of Bid Function Is Negative -0.18157*** -0.1262513** 0.13928** -0.13799 
(-12.01) (-2.28) (1.98) (-0.59) 
RESULTS WITH NO CONTROLS (GROSS INCOME ELASTICITY) 
Log of Family Income 1.91532*** 2.230293*** 0.46413*** 0.769185*** 1.675584*** 0.868852*** 
(35.23) (4.22) (9.74) (23.46) (13.67) (8.41) 
Log of Family Income if Slope 
  of Bid Function Is Negative -0.0807648 0.17831 -0.39031** 
(-0.22) (1.24) (-2.42) 
Number of Observations 1655 1685 1685 1678 1685 1671 
Notes: The dependent variable is the slope of the bid function (ψ); a few observations with negative values for ψ are dropped from the regressions in columns 1, 
4, and 6; the regressions in columns 2, 3, and 5 are estimated as endogenous switching regressions; the results in the first panel use the following 
variables as controls:  the percentage of households in the CBG that have children are married, just speak English at home, or are owner-occupants; the 
percentage of the population in the CBG that is married, is foreign-born, is Asian or Pacific Islander, has a high school degree only, has some college, has 
a college degree, or has a graduate degree; the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed; the percentage of workers with a blue collar job; the 
percentage of households in the county who are Catholic or who belong to a non-catholic church; the percentage of elementary students in private school; 
the percentage of high school students in private school; and the percentage of households in the tract who moved within the last year.    
 
 
 
